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New World 
A new home-financing industry is rising out 
ofthe inflationary wreckage ofthe late 1970's 
and early 1980's. Thrift institutions and other 
mortgage lenders are still uncertain aboutthe 
overall dimensions of  the new industry, but 
they're quite certain about one point-the 
long-term fixed-rate mortgage is dead. Poten-
tial home buyers, while unhappy about that 
prospect, can console themselves with the 
thought that mortgage-credit flows hence-
forth are likely to be more stable (although 
perhaps higher-priced) than in the past. 
The world of home finance began to shift in 
the 1970's with revolutionary changes on the 
liability side of  bank and thrift-institution 
balance sheets, as they began to pay market-
determined interest rates for at least some of 
their liabilities. Now, in the 1980's, revolu-
tionary changes are beginning to appear on 
the other side of  their balance sheets, as they 
attempt to offset higher costs of funds. This 
trend in assets has failed to catch up with the 
trend in liabilities, however, and the mis- . 
match has created a difficult transition 
period, making the first half of 1981  perhaps 
the worst period for earnings in the thrift 
industry's history. 
Most institutions will survive and even 
prosper (eventually) 'in the new environment, 
but to do so, they will have to understand the 
forces that created the present situation, 
including the interaction of inflation with tax 
structures and regulatory constraints. They 
will also have to understand the demographic 
factors supporting the basic demand for 
home finance, as well as the many non-
housing demands (such as re-industrializa-
tion) which compete for funds with housing 
in the nation's credit markets. 
Phenomenal success 
Amidst all this turmoil, many critics forgetthe 
industry's phenomenal success in keeping a 
roof over the nation's people during recent 
decades. According to the latest Census 
figures, the housing stock increased 28 
percent (to 88.3 million units) during the past 
decade, in contrast to an  11 V2-percent 
increase in the total population (to 226.5 
million). With this and the earlier housing 
upsurge, the numberof persons per house-
hold dropped sharply, from 3.3 in 1964 to 2.7 
persons in 1980. The quality of the housing 
stock also improved considerably over time, 
measured by increases in floor area per 
occupant or by improvements in such 
amenities as garage space or central air 
conditioning. In this connection, new homes 
are twice as large today as they were early in 
the post-World War" era; indeed, the typical 
mobile home today is as large as the typical 
single-family home of that earlier era. 
Home-financing statistics have shown similar 
growth; for example, mortgage-credit flows 
were three times higher in 1979 than they 
were a decade before. But the home-
financing industry suffered great swings in 
flows of  funds during this period (see chart), 
and imparted immense volatility to the 
heavily credit-dependent housing industry. 
Housing starts thus declined by half or more 
in the 1973-75 slump and again in the 
1978-80 downturn. And in the last several 
years, many first-time home buyers found it 
impossible to find affordable housing despite 
the vast growth of  "creative financing" deals. 
Demographic, investment factors 
Demographic factors will strongly affect the 
demand for home financing in this decade, 
just as in the 1970's, especially since the 
maturing of a younger generation always 
leads to a heavy demand for housing services. 
The boom of  the 1970's was sparked by a 
jump of 6.9 million (23.5 percent) in the 
population aged 25-34. Some experts believe 
that the shift of  that group into the 35-44 
category will stimulate further demand in the 
1980's, although much of  that stimulus prob-
ably occurred in the 1970's, as young indi-
viduals fled into housing as an inflation r)  .. 
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hedge. In the first half of  the 1970'  s alone, the 
home-ownership rate jumped from 39 to 46 
percent among individuals below the age of 
30. New demand in the present decade thus 
may have to rely upon the somewhat smaller 
(4.9 million) increase in the nurnber entering 
the 25-34 age category. 
Meanwhile, housingwill have to compete for 
funds throughout this decade with the 
increased financing requirements of other 
sectors of the economy. These requirements 
stem from the national consensus to re-arm, 
to re-energize, and to re-industrialize-all of 
which will require massive amounts of funds 
during this decade. These pressures suggest 
that households will have to pay consider-
ably more for funds in coming years, apart 
from the higher costs associated with the 
move to a deregulated mortgage market. 
Problem of thrifts 
Those factors aside, housing's immediate 
crisis centers around the problems of the 
home-financing industry, which has found 
that borrowing short and lending long is a 
losing proposition when inflation upturns the 
typical structure of interest rates. Last year 
was the worst since 1975, and this year could 
be even worse. In 1980, net mortgage lending 
and deposit flows at thrift institutions each 
dropped about 30 percent for the year, and 
more than one-fifth of  all thrifts posted red ink 
for the year. In the first half of 1981, some 
analysts expectthe 5,000 savings-and-Ioans 
and mutual savings banks to lose altogether 
more than $1.5 billion-an industry record. 
This bleak earnings picture reflects a mis-
match between the thrifts' sluggish asset 
yields and their market-responsive and 
increasingly deregulated liability structures. 
Almost two-thirds of S&L's total mortgage 
portfolios yield less than 10 percent, while 
more than half of their deposits consist of 
variable-rate certificates tied to high open-
market rates. According to an official of  the 
U.5. Savings and Loan League, "You can't go 
on forever paying 15 percent on savings with 
9 or 1  O-percent mortgages." Paralleling the 
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upsurge in inflation, average new-home 
mortgage rates jumped from 9 percent in 
1976 to 12% percent in 1980 (see chart)-
and hover around 15 percent today-but  that 
has failed to help the thrifts with their heavy 
burden of older mortgages. 
Problem of buyers 
Meanwhile, buyers have found thatthe 
standard mortgage instrument, developed 
originally in a time of stable prices, has 
proven unworkable in a timeofinflation. The 
borrower must pay the same amount each 
month for many years, even though the 
dollars he pays in the early part of the period 
wi  II be worth much more than the dollars he 
pays in later years. This creates a major 
stumbling block for a first-time home buyer, 
who must commit a high proportion of his 
current income to housing in the hope that 
the payments will become less burdensome 
at a later date. 
Would-be buyers will try to make that first 
step, however, because they see the inflation-
bloated equity gains that have accrued to 
earl ier home buyers over the years. That 
amount, estimated to be larger than one-
trillion dollars, serves many home owners as 
a source of ready cash. According to housing 
expert Anthony Downs, home buyers 
recently have taken out  about one-th i  rd of  the 
equity from sales oftheir old homes in the 
form of cash, using it for such purposes as 
education, vacations, and consumer-durable 
purchases. 
Wou  Id-be buyers can also see the advantages 
to home pu rchasers of  a tax code that was not 
designed for inflationary times. The U.S. 
income-tax system allows a deduction 
against income for all interest paid, which 
means that in an inflationary environment, 
the IRS permits the home purchaserto deduct 
sums that really amountto amortization of  his 
mortgage indebtedness. Moreover, as infla-
tion pushes more and more people into 
highertax brackets, it  steadily raises the value 
of  these home-owner deductions, and thus 
makes housing more and more attractive as $  Billions  Percent 
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an investment. According to Federal budget 
estimates, the deductibility of mortgage-
interest payments will provide a "tax 
expenditure" (subsidy) of $25 billion in fiscal 
1982, while the deductibility of property-tax 
payments will amountto $11  billion more. 
Deregulation cure 
The problems of first-time home buyers and 
their lending institutions will lessen if and 
when inflation is wrung out of the economy. 
A shift in tax structures could also help, 
although little may happen in this respect in 
the near future-except perhaps some relief 
for depositors who now suffer the fate of 
having part of  their capital taxed as it is 
returned in interest. But in another respect, 
the process of reform has already begun with 
the grad.ual disappearance of regulatory 
constraints under the terms of  the historic 
Depository Institutions Deregulation and 
Monetary Control Act of 1980. In particular, 
the legislation called for the dismantling of  all 
deposit-rate ceilings by late 1986. 
The process of  deregu lation began even 
before the passage of  the Act, when 
regulatory authorities permitted depository 
institutions to offer money-market certificates 
tied to open-market rates-certainly the 
leading financial innovation of the past 
decade. The certificates were designed to 
enable institutions to remain competitive for 
deposit funds during periods of rising interest 
rates, which in the past would have led to a 
complete disappearance of  such funds. 
Mortgage lenders also improved their ability 
to finance housing by developing mortgage-
backed bonds, which are debt instruments 
collateralized by pools of mortgages. 
Developing a solution 
Altogether, mortgage lenders face a severe 
dilemma today. If they pay the going rate for 
funds, they'll operate with losses because of 
the low fixed yields on their long-term 
mortgage commitments; but if  they don't pay 
the going rate, theirfunds will move into 
money-market funds or other unrestricted 
investment outlets. Yet that situation will 
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resolve itself with time, when the old 
fixed-rate mortgages are paid off, and when 
lending institutions build up their stock of 
variable-rate and other assets that move up 
and down in yield to match the yields that 
investors demand. 
Regulatory authorities have already adopted 
certain variations on that formula. For 
example, the Comptroller of  the Currency 
recently permitted Federally-chartered banks 
to write mortgages with rates that could 
change as much as one percentage point in 
any six-month period. Regulators also are 
considering·other steps to help mortgage 
lenders in the present crisis, such as 
expanding the secondary market for low-
interest mortgages, or perhaps allowing S&L's 
to write off  their losses on secondary-market 
loan sales over a ten-year period. In addition, 
some analysts have called on Congress to 
permit the rescue of  failing institutions by 
institutions in other states or other segments 
of  the financial industry. 
Meanwhile, the search continues for 
mortgage innovations which would allow  the 
all-important first-time buyer to leap the 
hurdle into home-ownership. These innova-
tions -such as the graduated-payment 
mortgage and the shared-appreciation (piece 
of  the action) mortgage-would mean that 
borrowers and lenders both wou  Id share in 
the risks and the benefits of inflation. But this 
would also enable borrowers to obtain more 
housing services over time. Overall, in this 
new world of  housing finance, mortgage 
funds will remain available, with no more 
credit crunches, but at higher and more 
variable rates than in the past. Indeed, the 
monthly mortgage payments of  the future 
might look suspiciously like the long-
forgotten rental payments of  an earlier 
generation -except  for their special feature 
of being deductible from income taxes. 
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BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT 
(Dollar amounts in millions) 
Selected Assets and liabiiities 
large Commercial Banl(S 
Loans (gross, adjusted) and investments* 
Loans (gross, adjusted) -total# 
Commercial and industrial 
Real estate 
Loans to individuals 
Securities loans 
U.S. Treasury securities* 
Other securities* 
Demand deposits - total# 
Demand deposits - ad justed 
Savings deposits - total 
Time deposits - total# 
Individuals, part. & corp. 
(Large negotiable CD's) 
Weekly Averages 
of Daily Figures 
Member Bank Reserve Position 
Excess ReserVes (  + )/Deficiency (-) 
Borrowings 
Net free reserves (+ )/Net borrowed( - ) 
* Excludes trading account securities. 





































Dollar  Percent 
7,493  5.4 
6,938  5.9 
1,833  5.3 
5,854  12.8 
1,677  - 6.9 
625  66.6 
74  1.1 
481  3.2 
3,412  7.3 
1,928  - 1,926  6.0 
792  3,792  13.9 
334  13,872  22.4 
- 168  13,516  25.2 
- 264  7,176  32.e 
Weekended  Comparable 
3/25/81  year-ago period 
n.a.  116 
139  42 
n.a.  74 
Editorial comments may be addressed to the editor (William Burke) or to the author, , , , Free copies of this 
and other Federal Reserve publications can be obtained by calling or writing the Public Information Section, 
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, P,O. Box 7702, San Francisco 94120. Phone (415) 544-2184. 